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Confronting Legal and Technological
Incongruity: Remote Testimony for
Child Witnesses
ABSTRACT

Child victims are often the only eyewitnesses in cases against
their abusers. A child's testimony may be necessary for a prosecutor to
secure a conviction. However, the child must often face his or her
abuser and relive the traumaticexperience while giving this testimony.
Any accommodations or protection of a child witness at trial must be
balanced against the defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause. The Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Craig allows
child victims to testify via one-way, closed-circuit television in some
circumstances, but the Court has not addressed two-way, closed-circuit
testimony or remote testimony. In the absence of authorizationfrom
the Court, prosecutors have been reluctant to utilize state statutes
allowing alternative methods of testimony from child witnesses. This
Note proposes a limited expansion of trial accommodations for child
witnesses, suggesting that the Supreme Court rule two-way video
testimony permissible in any circumstances where one-way video
testimony can be used. Additionally, testimony from a remote location
should be allowed when one-way or two-way video testimony would not
be sufficient to protect the mental health of the child witness.
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A nine-year-old boy sits at the witness stand, his hands sweaty.
He glances nervously around the courtroom as a lawyer questions him
about the things his mother and her boyfriend did to him. The judge
tells him to speak up-everyone needs to hear what he has to say.
But the boy is embarrassed.
He knows that what happened was
wrong, and he is scared. As the lawyer repeats her question, he looks
up and sees his mother's boyfriend staring at him, refusing to look
away. He told the boy that no one would believe him and telling
anyone about what happened would be a terrible mistake. The boy
begins to cry softly. The lawyer has told him that the only way to
make sure this man does not hurt other children is for him to tell his
story. Yet, as he sits there, he cannot escape the man's glare. The
memories he has tried so hard to stifle come rushing back; he is too
afraid to speak.
This scenario is far from uncommon. Children are testifying in
the courtroom more frequently now than in the past, due in large part
to more prosecution of sexual abuse claims involving children.'
Prosecuting these claims faces several obstacles. 2 Third-party witness
testimony is often unavailable to prosecutors; often, only the child and
the accused abuser know the details of what happened.3 Physical
evidence is not always present, and the testimony of other family
members, teachers, or other adults in the child's life may not be
conclusive enough for conviction.4 Thus, "the burden of producing
direct evidence of abuse can rest on the tender shoulders of a
traumatized child."5

1.
See, e.g., Katherine W. Grearson, Note, Proposed Uniform Child Witness Testimony
Act: An Impermissible Abridgement of Criminal Defendants'Rights, 45 B.C. L. REV. 467, 467 n.1
(2004) (citing Hon. Barbara Gilleran-Johnson & Timothy R. Evans, The Criminal Courtroom: Is
It Child Proof?, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 681, 683 (1995) for the proposition that in the five-year span
between 1985 and 1990 alone, reports of child abuse increased by thirty-one percent nationally).
2.
See Brian L. Schwalb, Child Abuse Trials and the Confrontation of Traumatized
Witnesses: Defining "Confrontation"to ProtectBoth Children and Defendants, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 185, 186 (1991).
Id.
3.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. at 187.
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Child victims generally do want to play a role in the judicial
process and can benefit from doing so, according to data compiled by
the National Child Protection Training Center (NCPTC). 6 The data
shows, "while children may not understand the players or terminology
used during the court process, they know that the process impacts
their happiness, safety, and well being; therefore, they want to be
When children do
heard and have a say in what happens."7
participate in their cases, they have a more favorable attitude towards
the process. 8 However, testifying in court may still be traumatic, and
the experience can exacerbate emotional and behavioral problems for
some children. 9 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford v. Washington,'0 children are now required to testify more
frequently. Yet, some of these victims may suffer irreparable harm if
required to testify in front of the defendant."
This Note evaluates the current status of laws governing the
testimony of child witnesses. Part I provides a summary of existing
guidance from the Supreme Court and state statutes enacted to
protect children as a vulnerable subset of witnesses. This Section also
explains key terminology used in these sources of law.
Part II
analyzes the confusion created by a lack of explicit authorization from
courts for remote testimony. Part II also looks at the discrepancies
between statutes, case law, and application of the law by prosecutors.
Finally, Part III proposes that courts should allow remote testimony
by witnesses who are medically unable to come to court to testify in
order to protect the most severely affected child witnesses.

I. JURISPRUDENCE ON AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHILD WITNESSES
Accommodations made for child witnesses testifying in court
reflect the understanding that children are a special, more vulnerable
class of witnesses.1 2 However, any witness testifying against the
defendant in a criminal trial raises Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause concerns, and courts must balance the welfare of child
witnesses against the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
6.

Allie Phillips & Susanne Walters, A Courtroom for All: Creating Child and

Adolescent-Fair Courtrooms, NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NAT'L CHILD PROT. TRAINING CTR.

(2013), http://www.ndaa.org/pdflA%20Courtroom%20for%20All%20monograph-rev2.pdf.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
9.
See Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child
Sexual Assault Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SocY FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. 1, 62 (1992).
10.
See infra text accompanying notes 54-64.
11.
See generally Phillips & Walters, supra note 6 (discussing possible accommodations
that can be made to "minimize anxiety and trauma" to child witnesses).
See infra Part I.B.
12.
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accused. 13 The Supreme Court provides general guidance on what
these rights are in Maryland v. Craig and Crawford v. Washington.14
Since the Sixth Amendment itself is silent on what exactly meets its
requirements, additional guidance comes from judicial interpretation
of state statutes that fill in the details of remote testimony
procedures. 15
A. Child Witnesses as a Vulnerable Class of Witnesses
Child victims of sexual abuse are particularly vulnerable and
testifying in court can exacerbate the trauma already experienced.1 6
When children testify about sexual abuse, they are often confronting
someone they know well, rather than a stranger.17 Perpetrators of
these crimes "often acknowledge that they look for the most
vulnerable children," targeting those with self-confidence or
self-esteem issues, as well as those who lack family support or need
help. 1 8 In many cases, abusers proceed to "groom" these victims to
gain their trust, producing victims reluctant to disclose abuse.1 9
Essentially, the perpetrator becomes someone the child alternately
trusts and fears, making the decision to report abuse one that is
fraught with conflicting emotions for the child. 20
Child victims have reported that the act of facing the defendant
is one of, if not the most frightening parts of the criminal justice
process." The experience of testifying can also be harrowing, and

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; infra Part I.B-D.
13.
14.
See infra Part I.B.
15.
See infra Part I.C.
16.
See Schwalb, supra note 2, at 187 ("[T]he traumatic experience of recounting
graphic details of abuse in an unfamiliar, intimidating courtroom, while also in the presence of
the abuser, can render an otherwise competent child functionally incompetent.").
17.
Thomas A. Lyon & Julia D. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause,
102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1204 (2012) ("Virtually all sexual abuse is perpetrated by
someone the child knows.").
18.
Id. at 1205 ("Vulnerability was defined both in terms of a child's status (e.g. living in
a divorced home or being young) and in terms of her emotional or psychological state (e.g. a
needy child, a depressed or unhappy child).").
19.
Id. at 1206-09.
20.
Id. at 1209-14.
21.
Harvard Law Review Ass'n, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102
HARV. L. REV. 151-52 (1998).
When three researchers from the National Institute of Justice asked courtroom
professionals what facet of the criminal justice system troubled children most, the
most frequently mentioned fear was facing the defendant. That experience is
frightening for most adults, but to a child who does not understand the reason for
confrontation, the anticipation and experience of being in close proximity to the
defendant can be overwhelming. This fear was mentioned by virtually all respondents,
including police, social workers, advocates, therapists, doctors and judges.
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"some courtroom trauma may simply revictimize an already
traumatized victim of abuse." 22 In recent years, courts have begun to
recognize this particularly complex dynamic between a child abuse
victim and the crime's perpetrator, and to make courtroom
accommodations for child witnesses as a result. 23
Courts will sometimes allow the admission of hearsay,
closed-circuit testimony, or videotaped testimony by children to help
reduce the potential trauma for child witnesses. 24
However,
prosecutors rarely utilize the closed-circuit statutes. 25 In a survey of
district attorneys across the country, respondents reported seldom
using "innovations" in child testimony and primarily using those that
were easiest to implement. 26 Because live testimony is generally
assumed to be more credible, requiring the child witness to actually
come to court to testify is naturally preferred. 27 When prosecutors do
pursue alternate methods for child witness testimony, these
accommodations raise constitutional questions.
B. ConstitutionalImplications and Supreme Court Guidance
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." 2 8 A witness testifying
outside the presence of the defendant implicates the Confrontation
Clause. 29 Courts sometimes allow a witness to testify outside the
physical presence of the defendant during civil trials, but the
constitutional guarantee set out in the Confrontation Clause requires
that certain procedural safeguards be in place for the defendant in
criminal trials. 30

Id. at 152 n.2 (citing D. Whitcomb, E. Shapiro & L. Stellwagon, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD:
ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS, 17-18 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22.
See Schwalb, supra note 2, at 190.
23.
See supranotes 16-20 and accompanying text.
24.
Jonathan M. Golding et al., Jurors'Perceptionsof Children's Eyewitness Testimony,
in CHILDREN AS VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND OFFENDERS 188, 199-200 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds.,

2009). Child hearsay is one way courts have tried to mitigate the harm (and in theory, this is
even less of an opportunity for "confrontation" than closed-circuit testimony). See id.
25.
See generally Gail S. Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses: A National
Survey, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 255, 263 (1999) (discussing how often prosecutors make use
of innovations).
Id. at 255-81.
26.
27.
Natalie R. Troxel et al., Child Witnesses in Criminal Court, in CHILDREN AS
VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND OFFENDERS 150, 161 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2009).
28.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29.
Grearson, supra note 1, at 468-69.
30.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) ("For good cause in compelling
circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by
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Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Confrontation Clause has

helped fill in the gaps of exactly how its guarantees apply to the trial
process; at its core, "[t]he right to confront one's accusers is deeply
ingrained in the human condition."3 1 This core right has evolved over
time in response to societal changes and notable trials, eventually
becoming "a bedrock" principle of criminal trials in the United
States.32 The requirements of the Confrontation Clause serve several
functions: (1) witnesses who testify under oath will understand the
seriousness of the situation, and the potential for prosecution against
them for perjury if they lie; (2) witnesses will be cross-examined by
opposing counsel; and (3) the jury will be able to watch these
proceedings, which helps in assessing the credibility of each witness. 33
The
seminal
Supreme
Court
case
addressing
the
constitutionality of remote witness testimony is Maryland v. Craig.34
In Craig, the Supreme Court evaluated the use of one-way,
closed-circuit video testimony by child victims in a case of child abuse
and molestation. 35 To allow the use of this technology, the trial judge
had to make a preliminary determination that "testimony by the child
victim in the courtroom [would] result in the child suffering serious
emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably
communicate." 36
The Court held that the right to face-to-face
confrontation was not absolute, and the state's interest in protecting
child victims from further trauma was compelling enough to justify
this alteration to traditional testimony. 37 In this decision, the Court
pointed out that the "central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to
ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary

contemporaneous transmission from a different location."). Though Rule 43 mentions
"safeguards," these safeguards are focused on security and reliability of the transmission, as well
as providing notice that a witness may testify by contemporaneous transmission. These
procedures are different from the preservation of constitutional rights endowed by the Sixth
Amendment. "Safeguards must be adopted that ensure accurate identification of the witness and
that protect against influence by persons present with the witness. Accurate transmission
likewise must be assured. Other safeguards should be employed to ensure that advance notice is
given to all parties of foreseeable circumstances that may lead the proponent to offer testimony
by transmission." See FED. R. CIV. P. 43 advisory committee's note to 1996 amendment.
31.
Judge Charles F. Baird, The Confrontation Clause: Why Crawford v. Washington
Does Nothing More Than Maintain the Status Quo, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 305, 306 (2005).
32.
Id. at 306-08 (discussing the right to confrontation in Roman society, in political
trials in England-notably the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh-and the Sixth Amendment's
ratification in 1791).
33.
Id. at 308 (summarizing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990)).
34.
497 U.S. 836 (1990); see Grearson, supra note 1, at 471.
35.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 840.
36.
Id. at 840-41.
37.
Id. at 844-45.
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proceeding before the trier of fact." 3 8 In describing what constitutes
"rigorous testing," the Court articulated the core elements of
confrontation: "physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and
observation of demeanor by the trier of fact." 3 9 Remote testimony, of
course, erodes the "physical presence" requirement, but the Court
reasoned that it was still permissible because the witness was under
oath and the defendant-or defendant's counsel-had the opportunity
to cross-examine. 40 The judge, jury, and defendant were able to view
the witness's demeanor; the level of adversarial testing was
"functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony." 41
Essentially, the witness's absence from the courtroom was not fatal to
the testimony since other procedural safeguards ensured that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were intact. 42
Craig also set forth the guidelines for a showing of
"necessity"-the finding a trial court must make to permit an
alternative method of testimony. 4 3 Under Craig, a trial court must
hear evidence to determine whether the procedure is "necessary to
protect the welfare of a particularchild witness"; this is a case-by-case
inquiry. 44 The court must also find that the presence of the defendant,
rather than merely the courtroom setting, would traumatize the child
witness, and that the resulting emotional distress would be "more
than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or excitement or
some reluctance to testify." 4 5

Justice Scalia stringently objected to the majority in Craig,
essentially arguing that the majority had wrongfully "merge[d] the
two aspects of confrontation-the absolute, determinant textual right
to face-to-face confrontation and the implications of that right."46

According to Justice Scalia, the Court had disregarded the plain text
of the Sixth Amendment to reach its holding that testimony that
preserved the other elements of confrontation-the "implied and
collateral rights" guaranteed through oath, cross-examination,
observation of demeanor-could be Constitutional. 47 In true textualist
fashion, Justice Scalia stated, "Whatever else [the Confrontation
Clause] may mean in addition, the defendant's constitutional right to
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 845.
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 851.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 855.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 855 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Penny J. White, Rescuing the ConfrontationClause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 615 (2003).
See Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be confronted with the witnesses against him means, always and
everywhere, at least what it explicitly says: the right to meet face to
face all those who appear and give evidence at trial." 48
Though Craig dealt specifically with one-way, closed-circuit
testimony, the Supreme Court notably declined to approve a proposed
amendment to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
2002 that would have allowed the use of two-way video testimony. 49
Justice Scalia rejected the amendment as a violation of Craig,50 noting
that the amendment was too broad, because it did not mandate the
case-specific finding of necessity required by Craig.5 1 Without this
showing of necessity, Justice Scalia reasoned that witness statements
outside a defendant's presence would happen frequently. 52 He
revisited his concerns with the idea of any video testimony, stating,
"Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual
constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect real
ones." 53
Fourteen years after Craig, the Supreme Court revisited the
Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington. 54 This case involved
the admission of a witness's out-of-court taped statement over
no
opportunity
for
the
defendant
had
objections
that
cross-examination.5 5 The Court held that the evidence could not be
admitted, as it violated the defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause.5 6 Though this case involved testimonial hearsay, not remote
testimony as in Craig, Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority used
language that implicates all remote testimony, clarifying that "[w]here
testimonial evidence is at issue .. . the Sixth Amendment demands
what the common law required: unavailability [of the witness] and a
prior opportunity for cross-examination."5 7 Justice Scalia concluded
the Court's opinion stating, "Where testimonial statements are at
48.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
49.
Hon. Catherine L. Anderson, Child Witnesses: Alternatives to Face-to-Face
Confrontation, 18 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. 22, 23 (2004); Natalie D. Montell, Note, A New Test for
Two-Way Video Testimony: Bringing Maryland v. Craig Into the Technological Era, 50 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 361, 376 (2011).
50.
Anderson, supra note 49, at 23.
51.
See Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference, COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE at 22-23 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CombinedSTReportSept_2009.pdf
(noting Justice Scalia's
rejection of the proposed amendment).
52.
See Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207
F.R.D. 89, 94 (2002) (statement of Justice Scalia).
53.
Id.
54.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
55.
Id. at 38.
56.
Id. at 68-69.
57.
Id. at 68.
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issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is the one the
Constitution
actually prescribes:
confrontation."58
Crawford set off a flurry of academic commentary as followers
of the Court attempted to interpret just how broad this holding was. 9
Though this case dealt with hearsay, the Court emphasized
procedural guarantees of the Sixth Amendment in all criminal
prosecutions. 60 Rather than relying on a judicial determination of
by
must
be
tested
reliability
in
testimony
reliability,
cross-examination. 61 However, the Court created ambiguity through
this emphasis on cross-examination, providing almost no guidance on
"what exactly constitutes 'effective' cross-examination." 6 2
Since
cross-examination is one of the core elements of confrontation the
Court set out in Craig, Crawford's treatment of the issue may affect
how the Court would analyze a future remote testimony challenge.6 3
After Crawford, the Court left open this question: whether various
methods of remote testimony allow the defendant the opportunity to
effectively cross-examine the witness in a manner that satisfies the
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. 64
C. GuidanceFrom Lower Courts and State Statutes
Lower courts have evaluated live two-way video testimony
outside the child witness context.6 5
Although most courts have
focused primarily on child witnesses as candidates for remote
testimony, these cases have forced the courts to grapple with the
scenario of medically unavailable witnesses.6 6 Notably, the Supreme
Court declined to address the use of two-way video testimony, denying

58.
Id. at 68-69.
59.
See, e.g., Kevin R. O'Neil, Navigating the Confrontation Clause Waters After
Crawford v. Washington; Where Have We Gone and Where Are We Headed?, 51 NAVAL L. REV.
175, 175 (2005) ("Trial lawyers and jurists all over the country read initial abstracts of the
landmark decision and immediately questioned themselves on its scope and applicability.").
60.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-53.
61.
Jessica Brooks, Note, Two-Way Video Testimony and the Confrontation Clause:
Protecting Vulnerable Victims After Crawford, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 183, 190 (2012) ("In effect,
the Crawford decision transformed the substantive Sixth Amendment right subject to reliability
balancing tests into a procedural guarantee provided to every defendant regardless of judicial
interests or public policy concerns.").
Id. at 191.
62.
63.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990).
64.
Brooks, supra note 61, at 190-91.
65.
See, e.g., People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2009).
66.
Id.
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certiorari in People v. Wrotten.67 In Wrotten, the witness was not a
child, but an ailing elderly individual. 68 Following the alleged crime,
the witness had moved out of state and poor health prevented him
from traveling to court to testify. 69 Before allowing the victim to
testify, the trial court required medical testimony showing that
coming to court would be detrimental to the victim's health, resulting
in a determination that he was "unavailable."7 0 During testimony, the
witness could be seen "very clearly," including "any expression on his
face."7 1
The defendant was convicted, but his conviction was
overturned on appeal, where the court held that "in the absence of any
express legislative authorization, the [lower] court lacked authority to
permit televised testimony." 72 However, the New York State Court of
Appeals relied on Craig and a state statute concerning child witnesses
to reverse the lower court and uphold the conviction, noting the policy
concerns that justified remote testimony after a determination of
unavailability. 7 3 The court went on to cite several examples of federal
and state courts allowing two-way video testimony when witnesses
were too ill to travel to court, and were thus "unavailable." 74
In Wrotten, the court referenced a statute passed by the New
York state legislature to regulate the remote testimony of child
witnesses. 75 New York was not alone in legislating child witness

67.
People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 959 (2010);
see also Brittany Gurrieri, Note, People v. Wrotten: The Need for Statutory Regulation of the Use
of Two-Way Live Video Testimony in Criminal Trials, 26 J. CIV. RTS. & EcON. DEV. 363, 366
(2012).
68.
Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1101.
69.
Id. at 1100-01.
70.
Id. at 1101.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 1103 ("Additionally, if Supreme Court's findings were supported by clear and
convincing evidence, Craig'spublic
policy requirement
is
satisfied
here.
Nowhere
does Craigsuggest that it is limited to child witnesses or that a 'public policy' basis for finding
necessity must be codified.").
74.
Id. (citing Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 317-18 (5th Cir. 2007)) (denying
habeas relief where state court admitted two-way video testimony of witness too ill to travel);
United States v. Benson, 79 F. App'x. 813 (6th Cir. 2003) (permitting the two-way video
testimony of an elderly witness too ill to travel); United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 79 (2d
Cir. 1999) (permitting two-way video testimony of a key prosecution witness too ill to travel); see
also Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203, 215-16 (Wyo. 2008) (approving live video testimony of a
witness too ill to travel to court in Wyoming); State v. Sewell, 595 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999) (approving live video testimony of a witness too ill to travel to court in
Minnesota); Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364, 1368-71 (Fla. 1998) (approving live video
testimony where witnesses could not travel to court in Florida, in part because of one witness's ill
health).
75.
Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1101 ("Indeed, the CPL [criminal procedure law] requires
live video testimony of a child witness in a prosecution of a sex crime after a judicial finding of
'vulnerability' (CPL 65.00-65.30)."). Notably, the cited statute is silent as to whether the child
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testimony; almost every state has passed a statute that provides some
guidance in this area.76 However, many of these statutes, as well as
subsequent cases that rely on them, provide only limited guidance as
to remote, two-way testimony.7 7 Many of these statutes became law
before the Internet made live, two-way video testimony convenient
and feasible; thus, they are silent as to whether testimony from a truly
remote location-outside the closed-circuit television confines of the
courthouse-is acceptable.7 8
Further, state case law interpreting
these specific statutes can cause additional confusion. This is due in
part to states' ability to set their own constitutional bar for the rights
of defendants higher than the US Constitution, with some requiring
face-to-face
confrontation
physical
and
presence
of
the
witness-requirements that are at odds with Craig's Confrontation
Clause interpretation. 7 9
Nonetheless, even states without the
face-to-face language in their constitutions have been reluctant to
explicitly authorize remote, live, two-way video testimony.8 0
In 2009, North Carolina passed one of the more recent statutes
addressing two-way video testimony. The statute's relatively vague
language could allow live, two-way video testimony, but it does not
expressly permit it.81 The law defines "remote testimony" simply as
"[a] method by which a child witness testifies in a criminal proceeding
outside of the physical presence of the defendant." 82 The law clarifies
that any such "remote testimony" must allow the judge, jury, and
defendant to observe the child as if the child were testifying in the
courtroom, defense counsel must be present where the child testifies,
and the defendant must be able to communicate with counsel during
the testimony.8 3 In a legislative bulletin, the University of North

.

witness can testify from a remote location, and mentions only live, two-way, closed-circuit
television, essentially restricting the potential testimony to the courthouse. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. §§
65.00-65.30 (McKinney 2006).
76.
For a state-by-state summary of statutes and case law, see Nat'l Ctr. for Prosecution
of Child Abuse, Closed-Circuit Television Statutes, NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N 1 (Aug. 2012),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdflCCTV%20(2012).pdf.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XII ("And every subject shall have a right to produce all
proofs, that may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face to face . .
80.
See infra Part II.B.
81.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1225.1 (2009).
82.
Id.
83.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1225.1(e) (2009). The full clarification of "remote testimony"
is that:
The method used for remote testimony shall allow the judge, jury, and defendant or
juvenile respondent to observe the demeanor of the child as the child testifies in a
similar manner as if the child were in the open forum. The court shall ensure that the
defense counsel, except a pro se defendant, is physically present where the child
testifies, has a full and fair opportunity for cross-examination of the child witness, and
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Carolina School of Government points out that this law is justified
under Craig, and it provides "specific procedures for trial courts to
follow." 8 4 This statement is true, in a sense, because while there are

almost no technical specifications or particular methods of testimony
articulated, this statement is true.8 5 The statute does provide clear
guidelines for trial courts to follow as to the judicial determination
that must be made before remote testimony is authorized. 86
Although the legislative bulletin forecasted judicial challenges
to the statute, thus far, courts have upheld the statute.8 7 Most
recently, a court held that the defendant's rights were not violated by
allowing an eleven-year-old victim to testify via closed-circuit
television because the victim was cross examined, the defendant
watched the proceedings in real time, and the defendant was able to
communicate with his attorney.8 8 This holding reaffirmed the position
taken by the court in State v. Jackson, another rejection of a
defendant's Crawford-basedchallenge. 89 The court in Jackson pointed
out that many jurisdictions had followed Craig in this circumstance,
even after the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, and the two
cases addressed different confrontation questions in different
contexts.9 0 Yet, even though the statute is drafted broadly enough to
allow remote, live, two-way video testimony-and has clearly
enumerated prerequisites for use-it has not been utilized for remote
testimony. 9 1

The lack of clear guidance in state and federal statutes, coupled
with the apparent discrepancies between Craig and Crawford, has led
lower courts to reach "inconsistent decisions and a plethora of
conflicting tests for the admission of remote witness testimony." 92
Indeed, the ambiguity created by state statutes and the occasional
acceptance of two-way video testimony by courts outside the child
witness context has led to "exactly what Crawford did not want:

has the ability to communicate privately with the defendant or juvenile respondent
during the remote testimony.
Id.
84.
John Rubin, 2009 Legislation Affecting Criminal Law and Procedure, U.N.C.
SCHOOL OF GOV'T 23 (2009), http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb0909.pdf.
85.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1225.1 (2009).
86.
Id.
87.
Rubin, supra note 84, at 25.
88.
State v. Lanford, 736 S.E.2d 619, 629 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
89.
State v. Jackson, 717 S.E.2d 35, 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
90.
Jackson, 717 S.E.2d at 39-40 (discussing the differences between Craig and
Crawford).
91.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1225.1.
92.
Brooks, supra note 61, at 201.
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individual judicial determinations of whether video testimony is
permitted." 93
D. Different Methods of Testimony
This Note addresses whether testimony from a location outside
the courthouse is materially different from testimony inside the
courthouse.
For purposes of this Note, the terms "one-way,
closed-circuit television," "two-way, closed-circuit television," and
"closed-circuit testimony" refer to testimony where the child witness
testifies from within the courthouse, or a room adjacent to the
courtroom, and the testimony is transmitted to the courtroom. 94 In
contrast, "remote testimony" or "two-way video testimony" refers to
testimony transmitted using an Internet or data connection that does
not require the witness to be in the courthouse or adjacent room. 95
This type of testimony involves newer technology than closed-circuit
testimony, and it lacks the physical constraint of cables and cords that
are necessary to connect a closed-circuit television system. 9 6 An online
video conferencing service like Skype 97 could provide an effective
platform for this type of testimony. 98
Id.
93.
See Nat'1 Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse, supra note 76, at 1.
94.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is a secured video system in which signals are
transmitted from a video camera to specific television monitors. . . . CCTV allows the
child witness to testify in a separate room, and contemporaneously transmit his or her
testimony to the courtroom. Several CCTV configurations exist. One-way and two-way
CCTV are traditionally used in child abuse cases. One-way CCTV has one camera and
one monitor. The defendant and the jury are in the courtroom with the monitor. The
child, the defense attorney, the prosecutor, and the judge are in a separate room. The
child faces the camera, testifies, and is subject to cross examination. The defendant
and jury must be able to see and hear the child's testimony. The defendant must also
have the ability to communicate with his attorney at all times. The two-way CCTV
configuration has two cameras and two monitors. The additional camera records the
defendant in the courtroom and transmits the signal to a monitor in the room where
the child is testifying. Two-way CCTV which more readily mimics face-to-face
confrontation is preferred.
Id.
See, e.g., Kirk Makin, Courts Turn to Video-Conference Testimony to Cut Costs, THE
95.
GLOBE AND MAIL (June 18, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/courts-turn-tovideo-conference-testimony-to-cut-costs/article4178446/ (discussing the use of Skype testimony in
Canada by a witness who lived in Denmark and could not afford to come to court).
Id.
96.
See What is Skype?, SKYPE, http://www.skype.com/en/what-is-skype/ (last visited
97.
Feb. 23, 2014).
98.
Though online services do raise questions of security, this Note focuses on the legal
basis for authorization of remote testimony, not the technical specifications that would be
necessary for a particular provider or messaging service to be certified for use in the courtroom.
For a discussion of technical issues with Skype testimony from an expert witness, see Claire
Duffet, Tech Glitches in Zimmerman Trial Were Avoidable, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Oct. 7,
2013, at A4.
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In terms of function, remote testimony is more closely
analogous to two-way, closed-circuit testimony than to one-way,
closed-circuit testimony.9 9 A typical two-way, closed-circuit testimony
setup would require the child to be in a conference room or other area
adjacent to the courtroom.10 0 The child would sit in front of a video
camera with a monitor showing her the courtroom. 101 Both the child's
and defendant's attorneys would be present in the room, and the
defense attorney would be in constant communication with his
client-through a headset equipped with a microphone, for example. 102
The video camera in the conference room would project the child's
answers into the courtroom, with "her facial expressions and
mannerisms as plainly visible to those in the courtroom as the
defendant's are to the child," but the child is physically separated from
any perceived threat from the defendant. 103 This scenario could be
replicated with the child witness in a remote location, with slight
modification necessary to determine whether defense counsel would
remain in the courtroom or be with the child witness.1 04 In contrast,
one-way, closed-circuit testimony simply projects the testimony of the
child witness into the courtroom, but the child witness does not have a
view of the courtroom proceedings or the defendant.10 5 The Supreme
Court reviewed one-way testimony in Craig and upheld its use. 106
Because the child witness can also see the defendant in two-way
testimony, the procedure encompasses and adds to one-way testimony,
fitting within the Court's rationale in Craig.107 Remote testimony
takes the separation one step further, and though Skype might be
functionally equivalent to live, two-way video testimony, the physical
99.
See generally Aaron R. Harmon, Note, Child Testimony Via Two-Way Closed Circuit
Television: A New Perspective on Maryland v. Craig in United States v. Turning Bear and United
States v. Bordeaux, 7 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 157 (2005) (discussing the differences between one-way
and two-way testimony, as well as differences in juror perception of the two).
100.
Id. at 157-58.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
Id.
103.
104.
Id. at 167-69 (discussing the use of remote testimony by an adult witness as "two
way closed circuit television from a remote location"). While the distinction between closedcircuit and remote testimony should not be blurred completely, Harmon's analysis provides an
argument that the appearance of the testimony to the defendant, the witness, and the jury is the
same during closed-circuit and remote testimony if both are done via a two-way system of
transmission. See id.
105.
Id. at 161.
106.
Id. at 159.
107.
Id. at 169-70 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit "distinguished the holding of Craig
from the use of two-way, closed-circuit television, stating that 'if Craig upheld the
constitutionality of one-way television testimony in an appropriate case, then two-way television
testimony, a procedure that even more closely simulates in-court testimony, also passes
constitutional muster."' (citing United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2003))).
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distance may make witness management more difficult.1 08 A witness
who is uncooperative or has a poor Internet connection could delay a
trial, and these practical issues may give a court pause in allowing
remote testimony. 109 Thus, remote testimony must be justified as
constitutional in its own right in order to be used as an
accommodation for witnesses.
II. CONFRONTING REALITY: FAILURES OF CURRENT LAW IN
APPLICATION

There are several possible ways to resolve the controversy over
child witnesses and to allow for the incorporation of new technology.
First, courts could interpret the Confrontation Clause to allow remote
testimony under all circumstances.1 1 0 Second, courts could uphold
state statutes that do not expressly forbid remote testimony; this
would likely happen through case-by-case use of remote testimony by
prosecutors and challenges by defendants.11 1 Third, courts could allow
federal rules or statutes to provide a source of authority for the more
widespread utilization of remote testimony. 112 Unfortunately, each of
these options falls short for various pragmatic and policy reasons. 113
The following sections evaluate each of these potential options in turn.
A. Complete Expansion of Remote Testimony
Although alternative methods of testimony are acceptable in
some civil contexts, 114 the Confrontation Clause sets criminal trials
apart.1 15
Nevertheless, some courts have allowed remote video
testimony in pre-trial proceedings and for expert witnesses. 116 -Some
practitioners see no problems with extending authorization of remote
testimony to other contexts."' Indeed, if the focus of the inquiry is on

108.
See Fotios (Fred) M. Burtzos, Beam My Witness In, 40 COLO. LAW. 107, 110 (2011).
109.
Id.
110.
See infra Part II.A.
111.
See infra Part II.B.
112.
See infra Part II.C.
113.
See infra Part II.A-C.
114.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
115.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
116.
See Michael S. Quinn, Comment, Wrotten But Not Dead: High Court of New York
Signals Legislature to Review Televised Testimony at Criminal Trial, 21 ALB. L.J. Scl. & TECH.
193, 210-14 (2011).
117.
See, e.g., Burtzos, supra note 108, at 109 ("I think most people can spot a liar from a
thousand miles away. If we as television and Internet viewers can spot politicians and others
lying to us on the news, at press conferences, and in speeches, jurors surely can spot someone on
a screen trying to pull one over on them.").
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the jury's observation and perception of the witness, properly
transmitted remote video testimony can provide just as accurate a
view of the individual testifying.1 18
The defense's presentation of a witness through Skype does not
raise the Confrontation Clause issues that would arise if the
prosecution made a motion to do so, since the Confrontation Clause
requires only that the defendant have the right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him."11 9 Some courts approve of remote expert
witness testimony, for example. 12 0 Defense witnesses have been able
to testify via Skype or similar remote, two-way video technology. 121
Allowing defense witnesses to testify remotely can also save money. 122
Recognizing these financial benefits, some courts employ remote
procedures for arraignments and other pre-trial hearings; without a
jury present, courts are less stringent about Confrontation Clause
concerns. 123
Additionally, the slow pace of litigation can make
securing witnesses in person more difficult.1 24
As time passes,
witnesses may move for various reasons, making it more difficult to
bring them to court, or at least more expensive to do so.1 2 5
Even with these efficiency and comparability rationales, a full
expansion of remote testimony to all witnesses is unlikely to happen,
nor should it. Despite the argument that remote testimony in real
time is equivalent to, or even better than, live testimony, courts will
likely focus on the prong of the Confrontation Clause dealing with the
accountability mechanism in place for the witness-what Justice
Scalia referred to as "plac[ing] the witness under the sometimes
hostile glare of the defendant."1 26 The varying standards for expert
118.
Id. at 109 ("Depending on the size of the screen being used and the quality of the
transmission, it could well be easier for jurors to see a witness sweat on a screen than from the
witness box. You probably can see an 8' x 8' 'talking head' a lot more clearly than you can see a
witness in a box thirty feet away.").
119.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added); Jay Meisel, Witness in King Trial
May Testify by Skype, HIGHIANDS TODAY (Oct. 12, 2013), http://highlandstoday.com/hillocalnews/witness-in-king-trial-may-testify-by-skype-201310 12/.
120.
See, e.g., Duffet, supra note 98.
121.
See, e.g., Meisel, supra note 119.
122.
See id. ("Shirley Whitsitt, the attorney for King, said the defendant is indigent and
the resources are limited to bring in witnesses. She said there's a possibility that in the end the
witness from California may testify. She said that travel, lodging and flood [sic] costs could
exceed $1,000. 'It gets very pricey very quickly,' she said.").
123.
See Montell, supra note 49, at 377-82.
124.
See Burtzos, supra note 108, at 108.
125.
Id.
126.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 866 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Whether this
should be the Court's focus is open to debate and empirical analysis, but the Court's detailed
discussion in Crawford of the Confrontation Clause's historical backdrop implies that the current
Court would likely focus again on how a remotely testifying witness would be held accountable.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-51 (2004).
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witnesses and accusatory witnesses-a distinction one author
describes as "disinterested witnesses" vs. "accusatory witnesses"-may
play a part in the way courts regulate them.12 7 While courts may be
willing to stretch the limits of Craig for experts, child witnesses
testifying for an accusatory purpose present a unique situation. 12 8
Child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are a narrow subset of
accusatory witnesses with unique characteristics that can pose
challenges to prosecutors. Often, when children are testifying in
court, they do so not only as witnesses, but also as victims.1 2 9

Juror

perceptions of child witnesses are key to a prosecutor's strategy since
physical evidence or other eyewitnesses are often lacking in these
cases. 130 In general, "adults perceive children as less accurate in
memory reports than adults."1 3'
When accommodations like
closed-circuit television (CCTV) are used, children provided more
accurate testimony, but were seen as "less credible" by jurors.1 32 It is
clear that these children are testifying about traumatic experiences.
Evidence suggests that trauma experienced after infancy can usually
be remembered well, even after lengthy delays. 3 3 However, there is
also evidence that these memories, though powerful, can be distorted
and some details forgotten.1 34 There is less evidence about children
who were exposed to chronic maltreatment, as is the case of many
abuse victims.

1 35

Though children can be effective and reliable

witnesses, children can be especially susceptible to "misleading
suggestions and memory distortion."136 Essentially, though children
127.
Montell, supra note 49, at 378-81 (advocating that courts should first categorize
witnesses, and then "apply a legal standard based on that particular type of witness in deciding
whether to admit the testimony. For disinterested witnesses, a deferential test that focuses on
the reliability of the witness statements should be utilized. For accusatory witnesses, the
precedent of Craig should be utilized.").
128.
See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text; infra notes 129-31 and
accompanying text.
129.
Golding et al., supra note 24, at 188.
130.

Id.

131.
Id. at 195.
132.
Id. at 199-200 ("For example in Goodman et. al.'s (1998) elaborate mock trial
involving 5- to 6-year-old and 8- to 9-year-old alleged child sexual abuse victims, children who
testified via CCTV were viewed as less credible despite a higher rate of accuracy than those
children who testified live in court.").
133.
Andrea Follmer Greenhoot & Sarah L. Bunnell, Trauma and Memory, in CHILDREN
AS VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND OFFENDERS 36, 40 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2009). ("[O]ne-time
traumas experienced after infancy and toddlerhood are usually well remembered, even over
delays as long as 6 years.").
134.
Id. at 40.
135.
Id. at 40-42.
136.
Iris Bland6n-Gitlin & Kathy Pedzek, Children's Memory in Forensic Contexts:
Suggestibility, False Memory, and Individual Differences, in CHILDREN AS VICTIMS, WITNESSES,
AND OFFENDERS 57, 57 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2009).
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are often crucial to prosecuting the accused in child abuse and
molestation cases, child witnesses do face credibility issues as
perceived by juries. 1 3 7
Thus, expanding remote testimony authorization to all child
witnesses could lead to further witness credibility issues with juries.1 38
Child witnesses may not understand the seriousness of the situation if
they testify in this manner and prosecutors would be unlikely to
utilize this broad exception if it existed with no limitation.1 39
B. More Aggressive Utilization of Current State Statutes
1. Judicial Guidance and Available Statutes
Another solution would be to simply maintain the status quo.
After all, many states do authorize one- or two-way, closed-circuit
video testimony, and some states have passed statutes with broad
enough language to encompass remote, two-way video testimony.1 40
There is, arguably, already a framework in place for truly remote,
outside the courthouse testimony after Craig.141 Craig opened the
door for public policy exceptions to in-person testimony and dealt
specifically with child witnesses; there is a possible exception already
in place for this class of victims and witnesses.1 42 However, this idea,
raised in Wrotten and subsequent commentary, is a misinterpretation
of the current status of the law. 143
The testimony at issue in Wrotten involved a witness who was
physically unable to come to the courthouse. 144
Two-way,
closed-circuit video testimony-as well as one-way, closed-circuit
testimony-must happen within the limitation of cables, cords, and
cameras linking the witness with the courtroom-like a "telephone"
made of string and tin cans rather than a cellular phone.1 45 Blurring
137.
See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
138.
See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
139.
See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
140.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1225.1
(2009); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 65.00 (McKinney 2006) ('Live, two-way closed-circuit television' means
a simultaneous transmission, by closed-circuit television, or other electronic means.
(emphasis added).
141.
See Quinn, supra note 116, at 209-11.
142.
See id.
143.
See People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (N.Y. 2009); Quinn, supra note 116, at
209-11.
144.
Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1101.
145.
See Burtzos, supra note 108, at 110 (highlighting one drawback of remote testimony
as the fact that the judge or trier of fact cannot control the witness if the witness decides to
leave, whereas testimony that takes place within the courthouse separates the witness and
defendant while still allowing management and surveillance of the witness).
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the distinction between two-way, closed-circuit testimony and remote
testimony outside the courthouse oversimplifies the issue.1 46 One
commentator on Wrotten relies on New York's statute 47 and The Child
Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights Act of 1990148 as models for
extending the availability of remote testimony to all "infirmed
witnesses whose health and well-being would be severely jeopardized
upon having to travel to and attend court." 149
This position is untenable because broad statutory language
alone, without use by prosecutors and enforcement by courts, does not
permit remote testimony.1 5 0 Massachusetts's child witness statute, for
example, allows testimony by child witnesses in certain circumstances
by "simultaneous electronic means," which is defined as "any device
capable of projecting a live visual and aural transmission such as
closed-circuit television." 15 1 This language is conceivably broad
enough to allow Skype testimony, or any kind of remote, two-way
video testimony. 152 The statute even allows for a motion to be made
on the grounds "that the child witness is likely to suffer psychological
or emotional trauma as a result of testifying in open court, as a result
of testifying in the presence of the defendant, or as a result of both
testifying in open court and testifying in the presence of the
defendant." 153 The inclusion of "as a result of testifying in open court"
as an independent grounds courts may use when granting a motion
could justify remote testimony that would prevent the child from
having to physically come to the courthouse. 15 4 Yet, Massachusetts's
state constitution includes face-to-face as a part of the guaranteed
confrontation rights of the defendant. 15 5 Further, despite the broad
language of the statute, Massachusetts's highest court found
146.
See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 116, at 193-205. Quinn interprets New York's current
state statute protecting child victims as allowing "Live Video Teleconferencing" like that in
Wrotten. Id.
[Tihe technology is typically comprised of a "point-to-point" connection between
locations housing two or more cameras, microphones, video monitors, and "'codec' (the
video conferencing hardware)." Through modes such as ISDN (Integrated Service
Digital Network) or IP (Internet Protocol), the voices and video image of the out-ofcourt witness and the in-court personalities are simultaneously transmitted and
displayed.
Id. at 200-01.
147.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 65.00 (McKinney 2006).
148.
Child Victims' and Witnesses' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2012).
149.
Quinn, supra note 116, at 195.
150.
See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
151.
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 278, § 16D (2012).
See id.
152.
Id.
153.
See id.
154.
155.
MASS. CONST. art. XII.
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testimony taken, pursuant to the statute, outside the presence of the
defendant to be a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation. 156
2. Prosecutorial Hesitation to Utilize State Laws
The reluctance of prosecutors to use existing alternate methods
of testimony is perhaps the most striking indicia that the current
statutory scheme is insufficient. 15 7 Prosecutors' reluctance may stem
from either wanting children to testify or feeling that the available
alternate methods would not be helpful. 15 8 Prosecutors who are
unsure of the constitutionality of alternate methods may be hesitant
to do anything that could jeopardize a conviction on appeal. 15 9 Since
child witnesses present a perceived credibility issue with jurors, and
jurors are routinely instructed that they can choose whether to believe
or not believe anyone's testimony, prosecutors may be mindfully
choosing the method of testimony that research has indicated is most
credible-live, in-person testimony. 16 0 Credibility issues aside, the
image of a small child testifying about details of abuse he or she has
suffered is a striking and poignant one. The child is often the key or
only witness in these cases, and a prosecutor will likely be unwilling to
forgo the opportunity to make such a strong impression on jurors.1 61
Gail Goodman, a leading researcher on child witness
testimony, conducted a nationwide survey of prosecutors in 1999 to
learn more about how they used alternate testimony for child
witnesses. 162 Goodman's survey took place soon after the Court's
decision in Craig. In her survey, Goodman asked prosecutors
specifically how Craigimpacted their use of alternate methods of child
testimony. 163
Prosecutors
were asked about a range of
accommodations for child witnesses throughout the process of bringing
a case to trial, including accommodations before a child's courtroom
testimony.16 4
Of these pre-trial accommodations, prosecutors

156.
Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 368-70 (Mass. 1988). In Bergstrom,
the testimony was taken in another room in the courthouse and a video monitor was set up for
the defendant to watch in the courtroom. Id. The jury observed on another screen and the
defendant was in communication with his attorney at all times. Id.
157.
See, for example, infra notes 159-75 and accompanying text for a detailed analysis
of how a group of prosecutors described their methods and motivations.
Id.
158.
159.
Goodman et al., supra note 25, at 270.
160.
See Golding et al., supra note 24, at 199-200.
161.
Anderson, supra note 49, at 23 (describing the scene of a child walking into court to
testify).
162.
Goodman et al., supra note 25, at 263-64.
163.
Id. at 264.
164.
Id. at 267.
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responded that they relied on "vertical prosecution, preparation of
children for testifying, the presence of a support person (e.g., parent)
in the courtroom, and a tour of the courtroom for children" with the
most frequency. 165 Essentially, simple, inexpensive techniques before
trial were used to help children become more familiar with the process
and more comfortable with testifying.1 66
In contrast, the innovations or accommodations used most
rarely by prosecutors were those that altered the proceedings during
the trial itself, "particularly by allowing children not to face a
defendant while testifying."1 6 7 When prosecutors were asked to rate
how frequently they used various "innovations" for child witnesses,
methods affecting testimony in the courtroom were used with the least
frequency of any option.1 68 The reluctance of prosecutors to use
one-way, closed-circuit testimony after the method had been
resoundingly approved in Craig is particularly striking. 6 9 However,
Goodman's study echoed earlier findings from a study completed six
years before Craig, where prosecutors voiced concerns that methods of
alternate testimony could violate the constitutional rights of a
defendant, which could be grounds for a reversal of a conviction on
appeal. 170
Prosecutors also reported the reasons they did not use
innovations that impacted the structure of the trial.' 7 '
Most
commonly, prosecutors reported that the court would not allow an
alternate method of testimony or a shielding procedure.1 72 Even in
states where one- or two-way, closed-circuit testimony has been
approved, these determinations are still often made by a judge in
pre-trial hearings, and a judge has discretion to rule that the
prosecution or child advocate has not made the showing required by
the particular governing statute. 173 The other reasons most commonly

165.
Id.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
168.
Id. at 268 tbl. 3 (listing "Screen to shield child from the defendant," "Two-way closed
circuit TV," "One-way closed circuit TV," and "Videotaped deposition" as the four lowest-ranking
methods in a list of thirty-two "innovations" prosecutors could use to impact the experience of
child victims and witnesses).
169.
Id.; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
170.
Goodman et al., supra note 25, at 267 (quoting results of B. Smith et. al., THE
PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE CASES (FINAL REPORT TO THE NAT'L CTR.
ON CHLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT), DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (1993)).

171.
Goodman et al., supra note 25, at 270.
172.
Id.
173.
See, e.g, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1225.1 (2009) ("Upon motion of a party or the court's
own motion, and for good cause shown, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether to allow remote testimony. . . . An order allowing or disallowing the use of remote
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given were "fear of defense challenge or appeal" and as a lack of
resources for using closed-circuit testimony. 174 Goodman offers several
theories for why prosecutors rarely use alternate methods of
testimony for child witnesses, noting that it is "strategic" for
prosecutors to require children to testify without courtroom
accommodations, even if doing so could be beneficial to the child
witness, when those accommodations might hurt the case.17 5
Only three of the survey's 134 respondents reported that they
had used closed-circuit testimony after Craig.17 6 One reason might be
the threshold findings required by Craig do not apply to all child
witnesses.17 7 Another is the inconsistency between Craig and state
supreme court holdings evaluating state constitutional provisions.17 8
Given prosecutors' fears of losing a case on appeal and courts' denials
of motions for alternate methods of testimony, it appears that the
discord between existing Supreme Court jurisprudence and state law
impacts the realities of the child witness experience.17 9
The realities reflected in Goodman's study have a structural
basis in the morass of statutes, cases, and research that continues to
complicate matters over twenty years after Craig.s0 Prosecutors do
have discretion on whether to pursue alternate methods of testimony
for child witnesses.1 81 Though not every method is approved in every
jurisdiction, almost every state offers some way for prosecutors to
modify the courtroom

experience

for child victims.1 8 2

However,

prosecutors choose not to use these statutes. 183 Given the damage
that may occur to child victims, this choice may seem "inhumane."1 84
testimony shall state the findings of fact and conclusions of law that support the court's
determination.").
174.
Goodman et al., supra note 25, at 270.
Id. at 272.
175.
176.
Id. at 273.
177.
Id.; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857-88 (1990); see also supra notes 54-55
(discussing as factors, case by case inquiry, emotional trauma to child that would be caused by
the defendant-not just the experience of testifying, and whether emotional trauma would be
more than de minimus).

178.
Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 377 (Mass. 1988); Goodman et al.,
supra note 25, at 273.
179.
Goodman et al., supra note 25, at 273.
180.
See supra Part IIA; infra Part II.C.
181.
Andrea L. Dennis, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Neglect of Juvenile Shielding
Statutes, 90 NEB. L. REV. 341, 345 (2011).
182.
Id. ("The ability to request shielding of at least some child witnesses is available to
prosecutors in virtually every jurisdiction."). Again, not every state will allow literal shielding of
the witness or remote testimony. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAwS. ch. 278, § 16D (2012).
183.
See supra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
184.
Schwalb, supra note 2, at 190 ("Regardless of the veracity of a person's testimony,
some courtroom trauma may simply revictimize an already traumatized victim of abuse. The
psychic damage caused by such trauma may be unfair and inhumane.").
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On the other hand, the numbers and ratings of self-reporting
prosecutors may not take into account some of the very real challenges
of working with child witnesses: children have falsely reported
abuse, 185 and their testimony and recollection can be impacted by the
suggestions
of adults-even well-intentioned
therapists and
detectives.18 6 Sometimes a child may not want to testify, but their
testimony is the only way the prosecutor can hope to secure a
conviction.18 7 Professor Andrea Dennis, a former prosecutor, states
that prosecutors' rationales fall into four main categories,18 8 stating
alternate methods are: "(1) infeasible, (2) needless, (3) ineffective, and
(4) impermissible." 189 Dennis argues that each reason is valid, even in
the wake of Craig and in light of new technology that is judicially
untested in the child witness context. 190 Still, the legislators who
passed these statutes "presumably expected that prosecutors would
use the latest addition to their trial-benefit toolbox, ultimately to the
benefit of both children and the public at large." 19 1
Thus, the absence of a prohibition on remote testimony,
combined with broad statutory language that could authorize remote
testimony, should not be read as a yet-untested solution to the
dilemma. 192 Prosecutors are reluctant to try even Craig-approved
closed-circuit testimony. 19 3 Exploiting legislative ambiguity is not a
workable answer to the question of how to best protect the most
vulnerable class of child witnesses.1 94
C. ProposedAmendment to FederalRules of CriminalProcedure: The
Uniform Child Witness Testimony Act
One proposed solution for this inconsistency is the Uniform
Child Witness Testimony Act. 195 Several states have adopted and
enacted this Act. 196
The Act was drafted in 2002 and was
subsequently approved by the American Bar Association in February
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 187.

188.

See

Faculty

Profiles:

Andrea

L.

Dennis,

UNIVERSITY

OF

GEORGIA

LAW,

http://www.law.uga.edu/profile/andrea-1-dennis.
189.
Dennis, supra note 181, at 346.
Id.
190.
191.
Id. at 345.
192.
See supra Part 1I.B.
193.
See supra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
194.
See supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
195.

UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS ACT (2002), available

at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/child-witness-testimony/cwt-amo2-final.pdf.
Id.
196.
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2003.197 The drafters "considered both existing state statutes and
Supreme Court decisions" in formulating the Act, and the Act accepts
that some types of remote testimony are permissible, placing more
detailed emphasis on the determination of whether a child can testify
remotely.198 The Act does not define the specific procedures that
would be acceptable means of testimony, instead defining "alternative
testimony" in the negative. 19 9 An "alternative method" of testimony is
a method by which a child testifies, which does not include all of the
following:
(A) having the child present in person in an open forum; (B) having the child testify in
the presence and full view of the finder of fact and presiding officer; and (C) allowing all
2 00
of the parties to be present, to participate and to view and be viewed by the child.

However, the Act is still not explicit about the method of testimony
used-whether truly remote, out of the courthouse testimony would be
appropriate or not. 201 In fact, the broad definition of "alternative
method" coupled with the lack of guidance on technological
specifications has led to sharp criticism that the Act should be deemed
unconstitutional. 2 02 If Craig sets the standard for Sixth Amendment
exceptions, no federal or state statute can be interpreted in a way that
affords less than that standard of protection for criminal
defendants. 203 Even though the Act was drafted broadly enough to
allow for "as-yet undeveloped technology" as an acceptable alternative
method of testimony, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the
acceptability of any method beyond one-way, closed-circuit
testimony. 204 Thus, a strict reading of the Act would place it beyond
the Supreme Court's approved method in Craig, as well as at odds
with states requiring face-to-face confrontation. 20 5
Practically speaking, the Act does not explicitly authorize any
technology, and in the wake of states adopting and codifying the
language for themselves, there has been no mass movement toward

197.
198.
199.

Grearson, supra note 1, at 469.
Anderson, supra note 49, at 24.
Grearson, supra note 1, at 470.

200.

UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS ACT

§ 2(1)

(emphasis

added).
201.
See id.
202.
See, e.g., Grearson, supra note 1, at 491.
203.
Id.
204.
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990) ("This case requires us to decide
whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment categorically prohibits a child
witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial, outside the defendant's
physical presence, by one-way, closed-circuit television."); Grearson, supra note 1, at 479, 49192.
205.
See Craig, 497 U.S. at 857-60; Grearson, supra note 1, at 491-95.
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the use of remote, two-way video technology. 206 Just as with the North
Carolina state statute, it seems prosecutors are reluctant to utilize a
method of testimony not explicitly authorized by statute or approved
by courts, as evidenced by the dearth of cases in which anything but
one- or two-way, closed-circuit testimony has been used. 20 7 These
proposed solutions similarly fall short because of vague terms leading
to implementation problems, as well as potential conflicts with
scenarios not contemplated and approved by Craig.2 0 8
III. FINDING A SOLUTION: AUTHORIZATION OF REMOTE TESTIMONY
UNDER A MEDICALLY UNAVAILABLE EXCEPTION
This Note proposes two changes to the existing status of federal
law. First, the Supreme Court should explicitly clarify that testimony
from a remote location, outside the courthouse, can meet the
constitutional guarantees of the Confrontation Clause under narrow
circumstances, and two-way, closed-circuit testimony can be used in
all scenarios where one-way, closed-circuit testimony is used. Second,
the Court should outline those narrow circumstances by adopting a
The
requirement of medical unavailability for child witnesses.
findings required for a pre-trial
determination
of medical
unavailability should be a case-by-case balancing of the child witness's
mental and physical well being against the defendant's right to face
his or her accuser, as in Craig. However, the Court must also
determine that one- or two-way, closed-circuit testimony would not be
sufficient to protect the child witness.
The Supreme Court should be the source of authority for
incorporating remote testimony. As evidenced by empirical data from
prosecutors, complying with constitutional guarantees as interpreted
by the Supreme Court is a concern leading to underutilization of
existing methods of alternative testimony for child witnesses. 209 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Wrotten, but did so because the
case was before the Court on "an interlocutory posture." 210 Justice
Sotomayor noted, "The question is an important one, and it is
obviously not answered by Maryland v. Craig."211 Justice Sotomayor
went on to add, "I think it appropriate to emphasize that the Court's
action does not constitute a ruling on the merits and certainly does not
206.
See supra Part II.B.
207.
See supraPart II.B.
208.
See Craig, 497 U.S. at 836-37; supranotes 34-48 and accompanying text.
209.
See supraPart II.B.
210.
People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2520, 252021 (2010), and aff'd, People v. Wrotten, 73 A.D.3d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
Wrotten, 130 S. Ct. at 2520.
211.
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represent an expression of any opinion concerning 'the importance of
an
Thus,
there
has
been
question
presented."' 2 1 2
the
acknowledgement from the Court that the issue of remote testimony is
separate and unique from the issue of one-way, closed-circuit
testimony in Craig, and the Court may be willing to address the
constitutionality of remote testimony in the right case. 213 Without the
express approval of the Supreme Court, remote testimony will likely
remain unused by prosecutors. 2 14
Approval by the Supreme Court would also provide justification
for prosecutorial reliance on state statutes with language broad
enough to allow remote testimony. Prosecutors making motions for
use of remote testimony, if the Supreme Court favorably addresses the
issue, for example, could employ North Carolina's statute. 2 15 For
states with face-to-face language in their state constitutions-like
Massachusetts-the acceptability of remote testimony would likely
depend on the breadth of the Supreme Court's holding. 2 16 Ideally, the
pre-authorization determinations required by the Court could be
interpreted as ensuring the same protections guaranteed by the state's
own Confrontation Clause. 2 17
By explicitly allowing two-way,
closed-circuit testimony, the Court could extend the protections of
Craig, leaving only a narrow range of circumstances where remote
testimony would be necessary to protect the child witness.
To pass constitutional muster, the authorization of remote
testimony should be limited to situations where a doctor determines

212.
Id. at 2521 (quoting Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari in
Moreland v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 547 U.S. 1106, 1107 (2006)).
Id. at 2520.
213.
214.
See supra Part II.B. (discussing prosecutorial reluctance to use alternate methods of
testimony for fear of reversal or judicial denial could be remedied by the Supreme Court's explicit
approval of remote testimony).
215.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1225.1(b) (2009). North Carolina's statute broadly
authorizes an alternative method of testimony as "[a] method by which a child witness testifies
in a criminal proceeding outside of the physical presence of the defendant." § 15A-1225.1(a).
216.
See generally Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857-60 (1990). For example, if the
Court were to frame the decision in the "public policy exception" language of Craig, that might
not be enough to justify remote testimony above state constitutional protections. See id. If the
Court declared remote testimony as the functional equivalent of face-to-face confrontation, this
would likely meet the bar set by state constitutions like Massachusetts's. See id. However, as
discussed later in this Note, this is not the ideal, or likely, solution.
217.
See Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 374-76 (Mass. 1988), for an
example where Massachusetts's highest court has focused on the quality of the testimony's
transmission and the adequacy of the showing made by the state to justify the use of closedcircuit testimony. The judge in Bergstrom expressed concern with how the alternative method
was used in that specific incident, rather than the constitutionality, under the state constitution,
of an alternative method as a whole. See id. Thus, even a state with face-to-face language might
be willing to employ remote testimony if the threshold finding is set high enough to meet state
Confrontation Clause guarantees. See id.
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the child witness is medically unavailable to come to court. This
rationale, like that of the court in Wrotten, encompasses situations
where the experience of coming to court-not only testifying in the
presence of the defendant-would cause trauma to the child
witness. 2 18 However, testimony by a medical professional that a child
witness is medically unavailable to come to court should be added to
the analysis in Craig to determine if the case is so severe or
exceptional that remote testimony should be authorized.2 19 A "Craig
plus" analysis would require a finding that the accommodations
provided by either one- or two-way, closed-circuit television would be
insufficient to protect the child witness. This highly tailored exception
is necessary to satisfy state statutory language and legislative
intent-and ultimately Sixth Amendment requirements-specifying
that the presence of the defendant, not the experience of the
courtroom, be the source of trauma. 220 Only in situations where the
child witness would suffer exceptional harm from coming to court
would there be the option of having the child witness testify
remotely. 221 Through Supreme Court clarification and expansion of
Craig, child witnesses who would be traumatized by the presence of
the defendant could still testify from the courthouse through two-way,
closed-circuit testimony. 222
This intended solution is a pragmatic one that prosecutors
would implement with confidence, rather than with hesitation because
of potential constitutional challenges.
Thus, even though Craig
requires a case-by-case analysis, the Court could provide some
guidelines for the medical unavailability determination. 223
For
example, giving testimony multiple times seems to have a greater
negative impact on children. 224 Children who lack a strong family
support system have more difficulty recovering psychologically from
abuse-especially those who testify in court. 225 Understandably,
children who endure the most severe abuse tend to have more

218.
People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1101-02 (N.Y. 2009) ("[T]he court ... held that
complainant . .. could not travel to New York without endangering his health, and was therefore
unavailable.").
219.
See Craig, 497 U.S. at 851-60 (discussing the analysis that must be undertaken
when deciding if remote testimony of a child witness should be allowed).
220.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1225.1 (2009).
221.
See Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1101-02.
222.
As the Second Circuit pointed out in United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d.
Cir. 1999), two-way, closed-circuit testimony provides an even more realistic interaction between
the defendant and the witness than the one-way testimony authorized in Craig.
223.
See Craig, 497 U.S. at 851-56.
224.
See Goodman et al., supra note 9, at 62.
225.
See id. at 119.
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problems coping and recovering. 226
The Court's guidelines could
include bright-line rules that would result in a clear finding of medical
unavailability for children testifying on multiple occasions, victims of
alleged crimes involving incest, or children who have undergone
severe, pervasive abuse.
Perhaps the most obvious example of this rule's applicability
would be a child receiving treatment in an in-patient facility or mental
hospital. Like the adult witness in Wrotten, leaving such a facility to
come to court might endanger a child under current supervision of a
mental health professional. 227 However, the level of psychological
services available to a child witness may vary based on location,
resources, or adult perception of the child's trauma, so lack of
in-patient treatment should not be dispositive. 228 Rather, the evidence
presented should center on whether and why accommodations
provided by Craig would be inadequate.
Though timesaving and cost-cutting rationales for remote
testimony might make a compelling case for allowing it in all
situations where a child witness might be traumatized, remote
testimony should be reserved for situations more severe-and
rarer-than that contemplated by Craig.2 2 9 Child victims already
present credibility problems for prosecutors, and the testimony of
child witnesses is often key to making a case of child abuse or
molestation. 230

Remote testimony introduces new hurdles of ensuring the
security of location and transmission, as well as finding a setting that
will not be unduly prejudicial to a defendant. 231 Additionally, without
a higher bar than Craig, there would be little to no enforcement
mechanism for making a child witness ever come to court. 232
Prosecutors faced with an uncooperative parent or advocate may
struggle to manage witnesses if a Craig showing were all that was

226.
See id.
227.
See Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1101.
228.
See Heather A. Turner et al., Predictors of Receiving Counseling in a National
Sample of Youth: The Relative Influence of Symptoms, Victimization Exposure, Parent-Child
Conflict, and Delinquency, 36 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 861, 861-76 (2007).
229.
See Montell, supra note 49, at 377-81, for an argument that remote testimony is
more efficient than even closed-circuit testimony. Skype, for example, is a free service requiring
only secure Internet service and two computers with camera and microphone capability to be
used in a courtroom. See What is Skype?, supra note 97.
230.
See supra Part II.A.
231.
See Burtzos, supra note 108, at 110. For example, a child witness testifying from a
hospital bed would likely not be acceptable. See id.
232.
See id. for a discussion of witness management difficulties potentially posed by
remote testimony.
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necessary to justify remote testimony. 233
Practically, given the
reluctance of courts, as well as state legislatures, to authorize remote
testimony, any change in the current law would need to be an
incremental step with a high showing of necessity. 2 3 4 Successful trials
utilizing remote testimony in exceptional circumstances might lead to
expansion of the method, but would prevent overutilization, both with
child witnesses and for other witnesses by judicial analogy as in
Wrotten.235 Since the court in Wrotten relied on Craig by analogy
without noting that child victims are a unique category of witnesses,
the Court must be careful to craft a gradual rule that will be applied
in a limited set of circumstances, rather than a more general
authorization that would open the door to remote testimony in all
criminal cases. 2 36
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's authorization of remote testimony
for child witnesses in cases of medical unavailability would protect the
most vulnerable child witnesses while
still protecting
the
Sixth Amendment rights of defendants.
Though current statutes
do not provide a clear basis for this authorization, the Supreme
Court is ideally situated to clarify the types of technology that are
acceptable.
Should prosecutors successfully use this type of
testimony in exceptional circumstances, courts and legislatures may
look favorably upon expanding it. However, medically unavailable
child witnesses are the class of witnesses most at risk. Until and
unless courts authorize remote testimony more extensively, child
witnesses who would be irrevocably traumatized or reinjured, not
only by the presence of the defendant, but also by the experience of
coming to court should be the subset of child witnesses for

233.
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857-60 (1990) ("In sum, we conclude that
where necessary to protect a child witness from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the
physical presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child's ability
to communicate, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit use of a procedure that, despite the
absence of face-to-face confrontation, ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to
rigorous adversarial testing and thereby preserves the essence of effective confrontation."). If a
finding of necessity is conditioned only on the presence of the defendant, not the ordeal of coming
to court, any child witness who qualified for two-way, closed-circuit testimony would qualify for
remote testimony. See id.
234.
See supraPart II.B.
235.
See People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, at 1100-01 (N.Y. 2009). Though this
solution is based on the type of medical unavailability determination made in Wrotten, remote
testimony for adult witnesses is not contemplated or addressed in the scope of this Note. See id.
236.
See id. at 1102-03.
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whom courts reevaluate current precedent on alternate methods of
testimony.
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